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Mentalising has long been suggested to play an important role in irony interpretation. We 
hypothesised that another important cognitive underpinning of irony interpretation is likely to 
be children’s capacity for mental set switching – the ability to switch flexibly between 
different approaches to the same task. We experimentally manipulated mentalising and set 
switching to investigate their effects on the ability of 7-year-olds to determine if an utterance 
is intended ironically or literally. The component of mentalising examined was whether the 
speaker and listener shared requisite knowledge.  
We developed a paradigm in which children had to select how a listener might reply, 
depending on whether the listener shared knowledge needed to interpret the utterance as 
ironic. Our manipulation of requisite set switching found null results. However, we are the 
first to show experimentally that children as young as seven years use mentalising to 





Once children reach school age, the domain of language in which development is most 
obvious is that of pragmatics, which is the ability to take context and knowledge about 
specific conversation partners into account in order to use and interpret language 
appropriately (e.g. Airenti, 2017). One aspect of pragmatic competence is the ability to 
interpret non-literal language such as verbal irony, which is where a speaker’s 
communicative intent does not align with the literal meaning of the utterance (e.g. Dynel, 
2019). The current study is concerned with prototypical forms of verbal irony where the 
speaker intends the opposite of the utterance’s literal meaning. For example, where a speaker 
says ‘That was a great shot!’ on seeing a footballer completely miss the goal.     
From a very early age, children hear verbal irony from their parents (e.g. Banasik-
Jemielniak, 2019; Recchia, Howe, Ross, & Alexander, 2010) and during the school years 
they are increasingly exposed to verbal irony in children’s books and films (Dews & Winner, 
1999). Mastery of irony is important in the longer term for social relationships since irony is 
often used to soften insults (e.g. Dews, Kaplan & Winner, 1995) and becomes increasingly 
integral for the banter and insults used by adolescents to maintain social relations with their 
peers (e.g. Aijmer, 2019).   
The degree to which a listener can easily determine whether an utterance is intended 
ironically depends on a number of factors, some of which can be learnt based on language 
experience and some of which concern the listener’s own cognitive and socio-cognitive 
abilities. Regarding the role of previous exposure to irony, clearly the frequency with which 
communities use irony varies cross-culturally (see e.g. Banasik-Jemielniak & Bokus, 2019, 
for a discussion). In addition, both adults and children take into account factors such as the 
speaker-addressee relationship (e.g. Whalen, Doyle & Pexman, 2019) and speaker occupation 
(e.g. Katz & Pexman, 1997), indicating that they draw on their past exposure to irony to 
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consider the likelihood that a speaker intended an utterance ironically. Indeed, certain 
utterances (e.g. ‘Smart move!’) may be more likely to be interpreted ironically than literally; 
that is, their ironic intent has become a conventionalised meaning component of that 
particular word combination (e.g. Burnett, 2015). Even the cue of prosody or ‘ironic tone of 
voice’ could potentially be learned on the basis of experience with the input.  
In the current study, our focus is instead on those cognitive and socio-cognitive 
abilities at the level of the individual child, which are highly likely to be implicated in the 
child’s ability to correctly determine if an utterance is intended ironically or literally when 
additional scaffolding from prosody or conventionality is removed. These cognitive and 
socio-cognitive abilities have been much discussed as potential causes of difficulties in 
atypical populations regarding their ability to interpret irony (e.g. Adachi et al., 2004; 
Caillies, Bertot, Motte, Raynaud, & Abely, 2014). What has received less attention is the 
potentially important role that these socio-cognitive and cognitive skills may play in the large 
range of individual differences in irony interpretation ability within typically-developing 
children from the same community (e.g. Zajaczkowska & Abbot-Smith, 2019).  
 One likely socio-cognitive underpinning of irony interpretation, which has received 
much attention in the irony acquisition literature to date, is that of mentalising - often termed 
‘Theory of Mind’ (see Filippova, 2014, for a review). Mentalising refers to an individual’s 
ability to understand that others may have desires, knowledge and beliefs which differ from 
one’s own (e.g. Harris, 1992). Traditionally, the method of choice for assessing mentalising 
has been tests of false belief understanding. Indeed, many studies have found that irony 
interpretation in children is related to their performance on these types of false belief 
understanding and related tasks (e.g. Banasik, 2013; Filippova & Astington, 2008; Nilsen, 
Glenwright, & Huyder, 2011).  
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However, there are a number of problems which make it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions from this literature about the role of mentalising in irony interpretation. First, 
there are a few studies which did not find significant relationships between measures of 
mentalising and irony interpretation (e.g. Massaro, Valle & Marchetti, 2014; Zajaczkowska 
& Abbot-Smith, 2019; Study 2). Second, many of these studies did not statistically control 
for core language skills (such as vocabulary), which is well-known to be related to 
mentalising (e.g. Milligan, Astington & Dack, 2007) and also to irony interpretation (e.g. 
Filippova & Astington, 2008; Nilsen et al., 2011; Massaro et al., 2013). Third, arguably the 
key aspect of mentalising that an individual needs to successfully interpret irony is not false 
belief understanding but rather an understanding of whether a listener has access to the same 
knowledge as the speaker. For example, if a speaker says “That was a great shot”, to interpret 
whether this is meant ironically, one needs to consider if the speaker saw the footballer score 
vs. wildly miss the goal. If one is judging whether a third party would interpret the speaker’s 
utterance ironically or not, one needs to know whether this third party listener saw that the 
speaker saw this. This aspect of mentalising is referred to in the literature as ‘Knowledge-
Access’ (Pillow, 1989) - and specifically visual knowledge access (see Moll & Kadipasaoglu, 
2013, for a discussion).  
 A relatively underexplored potential cognitive underpinning of irony interpretation is 
executive functioning, which encompasses the higher order cognitive functions required for 
cognitive control (Diamond, 2013). There are numerous findings demonstrating the role of 
executive functioning in pragmatic language processing by adults (e.g. De Neys & Schaeken, 
2007; Dieussaert, Verkerk, Gillard, & Schaeken, 2011; Nieuwland, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 
2010; Xiang, Grove, & Giannakidou, 2013). The same is true of certain aspects of pragmatic 
language usage by children (see Matthews, Biney, & Abbot-Smith, 2018, for a review). In 
relation to irony, however, only two previous studies have examined the role of executive 
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functioning (Caillies et al., 2014; Filippova & Astington, 2008). Both were correlational and 
investigated relationships with working memory (and in one case inhibitory control). Further, 
nobody has investigated whether mental set switching – the ability to switch flexibly between 
different approaches to the same task - is related to irony interpretation. There are two 
plausible ways in which mental set switching could work as an important mechanism when 
interpreting irony in two ways. First, it is well-established that mental set switching is related 
to the development of mentalising – or at least of first order Theory of Mind (e.g, Kloo & 
Perner, 2003). Thus, the role of mental set switching may be partially indirect. In addition, 
mental set switching may also play a direct role in irony interpretation because one has to 
potentially switch between the speaker’s and one’s own perspective and also possibly to 
switch between a literal versus an ironic interpretation of the utterance.   
There are also methodological challenges associated with determining which factors 
are important for children’s developing skill with irony interpretation.  One challenge is that 
previous studies investigating the role of socio-cognitive and / or cognitive abilities have 
almost exclusively relied on individual differences designs. A difficulty with individual 
differences designs is that there are usually numerous potential reasons why a particular 
measure (of executive functioning, to give one example) may or may not correlate with irony 
interpretation. Abilities which are not usually measured, such as non-verbal intelligence, may 
relate to both the particular measure and also the ease with which the child can handle task 
demands. Furthermore, while it is possible to statistically control for non-verbal intelligence, 
this variable tends to be so closely inter-related to other developmental variables that this 
process also removes the requisite variance needed to demonstrate the relationship of interest 
(see Jones et al., 2019, for discussion of this issue).   
Therefore, in the current study we use an experimental design to investigate the role 
of two potential cognitive underpinnings of irony interpretation; a) mental set switching and 
7 
 
b) mentalising. Our investigation of the role of mentalising focusses specifically on 
knowledge-access, i.e. the ability to take into account what other people know or do not know 
(and how this knowledge may differ between specific individuals). We call this variable 
Shared Knowledge. To manipulate this, we adapt a paradigm previously used by the only 
previous study to experimentally manipulate a proposed socio-cognitive or cognitive 
underpinning when investigating irony interpretation in children (Nilsen et al., 2011). In 
Nilsen et al.’s (2011) study, children were asked to judge whether a listener understood ironic 
intent, whereby the key variable manipulated whether the listener had (visual) access to the 
crucial information (e.g. when hearing ’that was a great shot!’, whether the listener witnessed 
the goal). 8- to 10-year-olds correctly differentiated the Shared Knowledge from the Non-
Shared Knowledge condition by being more likely to state that the listener would interpret the 
utterance as ironic in the Shared Knowledge condition. However, seven-year-olds did not 
distinguish these conditions in this manner.   
This brings us to the second methodological challenge in the irony acquisition 
literature, which concerns the development of test questions, which are sufficiently easy for 
children to understand. Nilsen et al. (2011), for example, asked children four questions 
following each vignette, two of which related to speaker and listener knowledge. To assess 
the child’s understanding of the speaker’s knowledge, children were asked “When 
[SPEAKER] said (a) did [SPEAKER] think that was good or bad?”. This type of “explicit 
judgement” question is very frequently asked in the field of child irony acquisition.  To assess 
whether children utilised information about speaker-listener shared knowledge to interpret 
irony, Nilsen et al. (2011) also investigated children’s understanding of the listener’s 
knowledge by asking ““When [SPEAKER] said (a) did [LISTENER] think that was good or 
bad?”. Questions asking for explicit judgements require a child to have an understanding of 
what she does or does not know, i.e. a certain level of meta-cognitive understanding. 
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Importantly, a child does not need this level of explicit knowledge in order to understand and 
respond appropriately to the use of irony in conversation. Rather, what a child (or adult) 
needs to be able to do as a proficient pragmatic language user is to respond in an appropriate 
manner.  
A handful of studies have utilised in addition to a judgement task a measure of irony 
interpretation by asking children to respond to an ironic comment (e.g. Glenwright & 
Agbayewa, 2012; Whalen & Pexman, 2010). For example, Whalen and Pexman (2010) 
presented children with vignettes and on hearing the speaker’s ironic statement, the 
experimenter asked the child for example “When I said ‘what a wonderful way to end the 
day’, what would you like to say back to me?”. Children’s responses were coded as either 
agreement (e.g. “Yeah”), disagreement, ambiguous, reconciling (e.g. “Yeah, that sandcastle 
looked good but it’s terrible when that happens”) or mode adoption, which is when a child 
used irony themselves to respond to the ironic statement. While this method has the 
advantage of being ecologically valid, generating a verbal response is potentially burdensome 
for children. Indeed, planning a response creates a greater cognitive load even in adults than 
does listening and interpreting the language of the conversation partner (e.g. Boiteau, 
Malone, Peters & Almor, 2014). and can also create coding difficulties (e.g. Glenwright & 
Agbayewa, 2012). More problematically, it is generally the case that for a large proportion of 
spontaneous responses, it is not clear whether the participant interpreted the target utterance 
ironically or literally.   
 Therefore, for our main study we developed a new dependent variable, which we 
hoped would combine the simplicity of a binary forced choice measure with the advantages 
of assessing children’s understanding of the type of conversational statement which can serve 
as an appropriate response to irony. After viewing and hearing each video-recorded vignette, 
children were asked how they thought the listener would respond to the ironic speaker. To 
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manipulate the role of mentalising, we followed Nilsen et al.’s (2011) by comparing within-
subjects whether the listener in a particular vignette shared the requisite knowledge to know 
that the speaker intended the statement to be ironic.  To illustrate, for the vignette in which 
the speaker said ‘That was a great shot!’, in the Shared Knowledge condition, both the 
speaker and listener saw that the footballer had wildly missed the goal, whereas in the Non-
Shared Knowledge condition, the listener had fallen asleep during that crucial moment of the 
football game. The novel element here concerned how children were asked to respond. That 
is, instead of using the aforementioned judgement task, we asked children to choose between 
an Irony-Consistent Response (e.g. for the missed-goal vignette “I know! It’s a pity that he 
missed!”) versus a Literal-Consistent Response (e.g. for the missed-goal vignette “Was it? So 
our team won?”).  We predicted that with our new dependent variable 7-year-olds would be 
significantly more likely to select an Irony-Consistent response in the Shared Knowledge 
than in the Non-Shared Knowledge condition. We also compared performance on this across 
three between-subjects conditions designed to manipulate the role of Set Switching. Here, we 
predicted that children who heard Shared Knowledge vignettes intermingled with Non-
Shared Knowledge vignettes would find it harder (than children in ‘blocked’ conditions) to 
demonstrate their ability to take Shared Knowledge into account when interpreting irony, 
simply because of the increased switching load.  
 
Pilot Study: Comparing our ‘conversational response’ DV with the traditional DV 
It is of course possible that our new ‘conversational response’ dependent variable might – 
contrary to our predictions - be more taxing to working memory and language processing than 
are the meta-pragmatic judgement measures used in the literature on irony interpretation in 
children. That is, in our ‘conversational response’ dependent variable, the participant must 
track whether the speaker and listener shared visual access or not and then evaluate the 
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speaker’s statement as well as the two possible conversational responses. Therefore, in a pilot 
study we first compared within the same group of children (and for the same vignettes) 
performance on our conversational response dependent variable (‘New’ DV) against 
performance on a meta-pragmatic judgement measure (‘Old’ DV). 
 
Participants 
The first author tested 20 monolingual, British English-speaking children aged between 6;02 
and 7;11 years individually in a quiet location. Six were tested in a separate room at their school 
(in Kent, UK) and the remainder were tested in the Kent Child Development Unit. 
 
Method for ironic vignettes 
The experimenter enacted five vignettes using two puppets (King and Queen) and some small 
props. In each vignette, both the speaker and listener (for which we counterbalanced the 
assignment of the King vs. the Queen) shared the knowledge (through shared visual access) 
required to understand that the speaker’s remark was intended ironically. For example, one 
vignette was adapted from Nilsen et al.’s (2011) ‘football’ vignette as follows.  
(1) The King and the Queen play for the same football team. They really want to win this 
match. The Queen kicks the ball, clearly missing the net. [Experimenter simultaneously 
enacts this with the two puppets, a ball and a small goal]. King: “That was a great shot”.  
[Note that both the speaker and the listener could see the missed goal].  
At the end of each vignette each child’s understanding was assessed using two types of 
forced-choice question. (See Appendix A for the other pilot irony vignettes). One was our 
new ‘conversational response’ dependent variable (New DV), which the experimenter 
introduced by saying “What would you then say, if you were LISTENER?”.  
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(A) Conversational response (Correct / Irony-Consistent): “Yeah, but you know that 
I’m trying my best”. 
(B) Conversational response (Incorrect  / Literal Consistent): “No, it wasn’t actually 
a good shot”. 
The other was a ‘meta-pragmatic judgement’ dependent variable (Old DV), as in (C) and (D), 
which the experimenter introduced by saying, ‘When CHARACTER says X, is s/he saying…..’ 
(C) Old DV (Correct):  The king is not happy with how the queen kicked the ball. 
(D) Old DV (Incorrect): The king is happy with how the queen kicked the ball.  
 
For each DV for each of the binary forced-choice options, the experimenter read each option 
aloud and also presented each option in a visual format. The two options for the ‘Old DV’ 
(e.g. ((C) and (D)) were read by the experimenter and accompanied by the pictures of a 
‘thumbs up’ or ‘thumbs down’.  For the ‘New DV’ the two options were read by the 
experimenter accompanied by speech bubbles containing the two options written down. For 
each dependent variable, the child could either point at the correct visual depiction out of the 
two or could answer verbally (or both). For each DV for each vignette a correct response was 
scored as 1 (see options (A) and (C) above), whereas the incorrect choice was scored as zero 
(see options (B) and (D) above). There were five vignettes in total and thus each child could 
obtain an overall maximum score of five correct responses for each of the dependent 
variables.  We counterbalanced both within and between subjects whether the ‘conversational 






For each dependent variable we calculated (in contrast to the main study) whether the 
participants choose the correct versus the incorrect response (see (A) – (D) above). The mean 
response accuracy was numerically slightly higher for our ‘New’ conversational response DV 
(M = 3.05, SD = 1.32) than for the ‘Old’ DV (M = 2.8, SD= 1.77). However, this difference 
was not statistically significant and the effect size was very small (t(19) = - 0.84 , p = .41, d 
=  0.16). Therefore, we can assume that our new conversational response DV is at least not 
more challenging for six- to seven-year-old children than is the meta-pragmatic judgement 
method used in previous studies. Moreover, performance on the two DVs was highly inter-
correlated (r(20) = .66, p = .002), indicating that they assess essentially the same construct. We 
therefore decided to further explore the utility of our new measure.  
 
Method and Results for Pilot testing of literal control condition 
For 13 out of our 20 pilot children, we also included the following two ‘literal interpretation 
= correct” vignettes, the presentation of which was interspersed between the irony vignettes. 
 (2) The King and the Queen have a new member of their football team. King: “What do 
you think of the new boy?”. Queen: “He is very kind. He gave me an apple yesterday”.  
Old DV: E said “When the queen says ‘He is very king. He gave me an apple yesterday’, 
does she think that the new boy is very kind [shows ‘thumbs-up’ picture] or does she 
not think that the new boy is very nice [shows ‘thumbs-down’ picture]?”.  
New DV: E said “What would you say if you were King?” Would you says “I’m going 
to my swimming lesson after school today” [shows speech bubble] or would you say 




(3) [E makes the puppets speak as follows]. The King: “Would you like to go to the 
cinema with me this Sunday?”. The Queen: “Yes, sure. Should we go to see the new 
Lego Batman movie?”.  
New DV: E said “What would you say if you were the King? Would you say “Yeah, 
I’d love to see that movie” [E showed one speech bubble] or would you say “This pizza 
is really good” [E showed other speech bubble].  
Old DV: E said “When the Queen says “Yes sure. Should we go to see the new Lego 
Batman movie?”, does she really not want to go to the cinema with the King [E showed 
‘thumbs-down’ picture] or does she want to go to the cinema with the King [E showed 
‘thumbs-up picture].  
For these two ‘literal’ vignettes, performance across the 13 children was 100% correct for the 
‘new’ DV and 96% correct for the ‘old’ DV.  
 
Main Study 
Pre-study: Generation of materials from adult conversational responses 
To generate our ‘conversational response’ dependent variable for the main study, the first 
author tested 21 adult native speakers of British English, most of whom were university 
students. All were naïve to the aims of the study. Participants were presented with vignettes 
(see examples (4) and (6) below) ending with the speaker’s utterance. The participants were 
then asked to write down how they would respond as a listener. Ten of these participants 
were only presented with vignettes which would require a ‘literal-consistent’ response, as in 
example 4 below. None of the responses of the participants in this condition indicated that 




(4) Imagine that you and your friend really want to go for a picnic. While you are 
having a nap, your friend peeks through the curtains. When you open your eyes, the 
curtains are still closed. He says, “It’s a perfect day for a picnic”. What would you say 
in response?  
(5) 
Participant 1: “Let me wake up first, then we’ll think about going”. 
Participant 2: “I would ask him when he would like to go and where he would like to go”. 
Participant 3: “I would be a bit annoyed that I got disturbed during my nap. However, since I 
really wanted to go on the picnic, I would probably wake up and get ready to go”. 
Participant 4: “That’s great! Let’s go”. 
Participant 5: “Shall we go out for one then and go to the park?” 
Participant 6: “Great! Why don’t we go out then!” 
Participant 7: “Is it sunny out there?” 
Participant 8: “Let me see first”. 
Participant 9: “How do you know?” 
Participant 10: “What’s the weather like?” 
 
The remaining eleven participants were exposed to versions of the same vignettes, where the 
adaptation made it clear that the speaker intended the utterance ironically (see (6) below for 
the ironic version of (4)).  The speaker’s statements were identical across these two 
conditions. It was never the case that the utterance was a phrase which is used ironically with 




(6) Imagine that you and your friend really want to go for a picnic. You open the 
curtains and you both see that it’s raining. Your friend says, “It’s a perfect day for a 
picnic”. What would you say in response? 
 
The most frequently occurring responses were selected as the dependent variable options for 
our study. Thus, from the responses in (5) above, we derived the response ‘Great! Let’s go 
then. For some conversational response options additional words were added to ensure that 




Method for main study 
Shared Knowledge manipulation 
There were ten video-recorded vignette types (e.g. ‘picnic’, ‘goal’, ‘vacuum cleaner’), 
each with a male and female actor, whereby for each we created both a Shared and a Non-
Shared knowledge variant. Thus, there exist 20 vignettes in total (see Appendix B). Both the 
number of words and the length of the videos across the two conditions were matched.  
Importantly, for each version of a vignette type (e.g. for both the Shared and Non-Shared 
version of ‘picnic’) the speaker’s statement and the binary-choice dependent variable options 
were identical. Moreover, the speaker’s intonation and facial affect was also identical at this 
point; the actors were instructed to keep the facial and prosody slightly positive, as if the 
statement that they uttered were literal and this part was filmed prior to the rest of the vignette 
(and thus they were ignorant as to whether they were in an ironic or literal context). To ensure 
that the intonation was the same in the corresponding videos across conditions, we used the 
same audio recording of the final utterance for both videos.  
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The only way in which the Shared versus Non-Shared versions of each vignette type 
differed related to visual access to knowledge. For example, in the ‘goal’ vignette in the 
Shared condition, both the speaker and listener witnessed the goal whereas in the Non-Shared 
condition, the listener was asleep when the footballer attempted to score.  
Vignettes were presented via a laptop and participants clicked on the response 
options. Regardless of condition, the selection of an Irony-Consistent response (e.g. “I know! 
It’s a pity he missed” for the goal vignette) was scored by the computer as 1, whereas the 
selection of a Literal-Consistent response (e.g. “Was it? So our team won!”) was scored as 0. 
Therefore, if participants did not distinguish the Shared vs. Non-Shared conditions, there 
should be identical performance in both.   
Each child was presented with vignettes from both the Shared and Non-Shared 
conditions, although never with items from the same vignette-type (e.g. s/he only saw the 
goal vignette in one of these conditions). Thus, each child saw five vignettes in each 
condition. (The specific items were counterbalanced within each between-subjects Switching 
group).  
Practice phase: Each child participated in three practice trials, none of which included an ironic 
statement. These trials also differed from the test trials in two ways. First, children were asked 
“Which one do you think the boy/the girl would answer?”.  Second, when the children were 
not sure which answer to choose, the content of the story was repeated and the prompt question 
was asked again. All of the children passed the second and the third example trials without the 
need for repetition.  
Test trials:  After each video vignette, the participant could either replay the video or move 
on the next section where s/he was asked to select a binary forced-choice reply on the part of 
the listener (i.e. Irony-Consistent vs. Literal-Consistent). Participants could both see and hear 
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the pre-recorded response options. See FIG 1 below for an example of how the response 








Study 1 was carried out to verify that adult native speakers of English would in fact tend to 
select the Irony-Consistent response in the Shared Knowledge condition, as opposed to 





The first author tested 14 native British English-speaking adults, most of whom were 
university students. None of the 14 participants had participated in the Pre-Study. Each 
participant saw video-recorded versions of vignettes in the Shared Knowledge and Non-Shared 
Knowledge conditions. The Shared Knowledge vignettes were interspersed with Non-Shared 
Knowledge vignettes, as in the ‘Mixed’ condition in Study 2 below.  
 
Results 
Adults showed an extremely clear differentiation between the Shared Knowledge and 
Non-Shared Knowledge conditions; in the Shared Knowledge condition, they selected the 
ironic-consistent response 94% of the time, whereas in the Non-Shared Knowledge condition, 
they only did this 9% of the time (t(13) = 17.55, p < .001, d = 6.81). Thus, as expected, native 
English-speaking adults are extremely proficient at taking the listener’s knowledge state into 
account when interpreting ironic remarks and select conversational responses accordingly.  
 
Study 2 
Shared Knowledge manipulation 
The method for study was exactly the same as for Study 1. The only difference was that in 
addition, we also investigated the role of mental set switching by assigning participants to 
one of three between-subjects conditions as follows. (To ensure that the three conditions were 






To investigate the role of switching, each child was pre-assigned to one of three Switching 
conditions, which only differed from one another in terms of the task order, as illustrated in 
Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1: Task order by Switching Condition  
Task 
order 
Mixed Shared First Non-Shared First 
1 Shared / Non-Shared 
intermingled 
(10 items) 
Shared condition  
(5 items) 
Non-Shared 
condition (5 items) 
2 Non-verbal IQ task Non-verbal IQ task 







condition (5 items) 
Shared condition  
(5 items) 
 
The position of the foil vs. target answer was counterbalanced across each of the conditions 
and also within each participant. Each version (Shared vs. Non-Shared) of each vignette-type 
was presented equally often across each of the three Switching conditions. The order of 
vignette-types (e.g. ‘picnic’, ‘vacuum cleaner’) within each condition in the Shared-First and 
Non-Shared-First conditions was randomized.  
 
Child Participants 
Seventy-eight typically-developing children took part in the study (M age = 88.89, range = 
6;10 – 7;11), all of whom were tested by the first author. None had participated in the pilot 
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study. Ten children in each Switching condition were recruited through and tested in the Kent 
Child Development Unit. The remaining participants in each Switching condition were 
recruited from local primary schools in Kent, UK. All participants were monolingual speakers 
of British English with no suspected developmental disorders. The three Switching conditions 
were matched on chronological age, expressive language, and non-verbal IQ (see Table 3 
below - all p > .38). Expressive language was assessed with the Expressive Vocabulary sub-
test of the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals – Fifth Edition (CELF- 5; Semel, 
Wiig, & Secord, 2013). In order to assess non-verbal IQ, we carried out the Matrices subtest 
from the British Ability Scales (BAS; Elliot & Smith, 2011).  
 
Table 2. Means (SD) for the age, non-verbal IQ, expressive vocabulary plus gender ratio for 
the three Switching conditions.  
 Mixed Condition 
(N= 26) 
Shared First  
(N = 21)  
Non-Shared first  
(N = 22) 
Chronological age in 
months 
88.77 (4.31) 89.10 (3.43) 89.00 (3.88) 
Non-verbal IQ: 
British Ability Scale 
T-score  
43.58 (9.75) 47.24 (13.43) 46.71 (7.71) 
Expressive 
Vocabulary CELF – 
5 Scaled Score 
10.54 (2.06) 11.24(2.64) 11.23 (2.47) 





Thus, our study had a mixed two (Knowledge: Shared vs. Non-Shared) x three (Switching: 
Mixed, Shared-first, Non-Shared-first) design. 
 
Main Study Analysis 
We fitted the data with a binomial mixed-effects regression model predicting ironic 
interpretation responses, using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) 
in R (R Core Team, 2018). The model included fixed effects of (a) the within-subjects factor 
of Knowledge (Shared, Non-Shared), (b) the between-subjects Switching Condition (Mixed, 
Shared-First, and Non-Shared-First), and the interaction of Knowledge and Switching 
Condition. The Switching Condition was coded with Helmert contrasts, whereby the Mixed 
condition was coded as the baseline for the first contrast, following our switching hypothesis. 
The second contrast compared the two ‘blocked’ condition: Shared-First vs. Non-Shared-First.  
Following Barr, Levy, Scheepers and Tily (2013) we included the maximal random 
effects structure supported by the data. The maximal model included random intercepts for 
participants and items, by-participants random slopes for Knowledge State, and by-items 
random slopes for Knowledge, Switching and their interaction. The random effects structure 
was reduced one term at a time beginning with the highest order term, until the model 
converged, resulting in a final model with only random intercepts for participants and items.1.  
 
Main Study Results 
Table 3 shows the proportion of responses that were consistent with the ironic interpretation 
by Knowledge State and by each of the three Switching Conditions (Mixed, Shared-First, Non-
Shared First). 
                                                          
1 Our final model was as follows: IronicResponse ~ KnowledgeState + Switching + KnowledgeState: Switching 






Table 3. The proportion of responses consistent with an ironic interpretation by 
Knowledge State and Switching  









Shared .55 (.50) .68 (.47) .54 (.50) 
Non-shared .27 (.45) .38 (.49) .28 (.45) 
 
We found a significant main effect of Knowledge (β=1.65, SE=.21, p<.001), such that 
responses consistent with the ironic interpretation were (appropriately) more likely in the 
Shared than in the Non-Shared condition. There were no significant effects for the Switching 
Condition  (contrast 1 (Mixed condition vs Blocked conditions): β=.33, SE=.24, p=.16; contrast 
2 (Shared Knowledge First vs. Shared Knowledge second): β=-.15, SE=.14, p=.30). No 
interactions between Knowledge and Switching were significant (for contrast 1: β=.024, 
SE=.23, p=.92; for contrast 2: β=-.030, SE=.14, p=.84).2  
 
Discussion 
In the current study, we developed a novel measure for irony comprehension in children. 
Rather than being asked to judge what a speaker thinks or means (or to verbally formulate 
their own response), children were instead asked to select how they thought a listener might 
respond. The binary forced-choice ‘conversational’ response options were developed from 
spontaneous responses by adults to the items. In addition, the current study is one of very few 
                                                          
2 A mixed factorial 2 (Knowledge State) x 3 (Switching Condition) ANOVA found the same pattern of results, with a main effect for 
Knowledge State (F(1,66) = 43.25, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2= 4), no effect for Switching (F = 2, 66 = 1.39, p = .26, 𝜂𝑝
2= .04) and no interaction (F(2,66) = 
.08, p = .92, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .002). None of the pairwise comparisons between switching conditions were significant (all p > .6, all Cohen’s d < .3).  
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which has attempted to experimentally manipulate suspected cognitive underpinnings of the 
irony interpretation in children. Using our novel dependent variable, we found a role for one 
cognitive underpinning that we manipulated (i.e. mentalising) but not the other cognitive 
underpinning that we manipulated (set switching) in how seven-year-olds interpret ironic 
utterances.  
 Regarding switching, ours is the first study (whether correlational or experimental) to 
investigate whether this plays a role in how children interpret irony. One possibility is that our 
null result for this variable indicates that switching is not of particular relevance. An alternative 
possible explanation might be that the switching element is always implicitly present when 
processing ironic utterances (e.g. De Neys & Schaeken, 2007). To clarify, even if the child had 
a block of videos including only ironic utterances, it is possible that the literal meaning would 
still be activated at some level – even if only weakly. While this ‘literal-first’ view of irony 
interpretation is hotly contested (e.g. Gibbs, 1983; Kowatch, Whalen, & Pexman, 2013), eye-
tracking studies with adults certainly indicate that multiple processes are required for irony-
interpretation, but that the integration of these proceeds extremely fast in real time (e.g. Barzy, 
Filik, Williams & Ferguson, 2020). Thus, it is certainly possible that our design was too 
simplistic and that online measures such as eye-tracking are necessary in order to detect the 
role of mental set switching in irony interpretation – at least in an experimental paradigm.  
Regarding mentalising, our experimental findings fit with findings from numerous 
individual differences studies, which found correlations in children around this age between 
irony interpretation and second-order false belief understanding, which is the ability to 
understand that another individual can have a false belief about a third party’s knowledge 
state (e.g. Filippova & Astington, 2008). However, we by no means wish to claim that 
second-order false belief understanding is necessary in order to successfully determine 
whether an utterance is intended ironically or literally. Even in situations where prosodic and 
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other ‘likelihood’ indicators (such as speaker-listener relationship) are removed or controlled 
– i.e. situations where the listener is more reliant on mentalising than is always the case – we 
would argue that second-order false belief is nonetheless not essential to interpret irony 
correctly. That is, to understand in our task (and Nilsen et al.’s, 2011, task) that – for example 
– Emma might interpret Matt’s utterance literally, a child does not need to understand that 
Emma might have false beliefs. Rather, the child merely has to understand that Emma does 
not have access to the same knowledge (e.g. the ball is flat) to which Matt has access. Thus, 
the requisite aspect of mentalising here is in fact knowledge-access, which is typically 
demonstrated by children well before they pass traditional first-order false belief tasks (e.g. 
Wellman & Liu, 2004).  We follow the view that adult-like mentalising is acquired in a 
gradual fashion (see e.g. Tomasello, 2018), where different components of mentalising are 
likely to correlate with one another in development.  
 
Limitations 
Our Pilot Study results indicate that our novel ‘binary forced choice conversational response’ 
dependent variable was not in fact easier for children than the traditional forced choice 
judgement tasks (e.g. “When the King said “that was a great shot!”, was he happy with how 
the Queen kicked the ball or not happy with how the Queen kicked the ball?”). There are 
several potential reasons for this. First, with our new response type, the child – as in all 
previous studies - must maintain the relevant event schemas in working memory. Then, as for 
traditional judgment tasks, the child has to simultaneously evaluate the statement as well as 
two possible responses. Furthermore, as in Nilsen et al.’s (2011) study, the child has to 
represent not only the speaker's mental state but also that of the listener in the story in order 
to decide how the listener might respond. Thus, as for all previous measures of irony 
interpretation in children, our task still burdens working memory, vocabulary – and also 
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syntax to a degree. In addition, it is entirely plausible that the degree to which particular 
conversational response options are ‘acceptable’ or ‘fitting’ may vary from vignette to 
vignette, which is something future studies could explore. More critically, future studies are 
also needed to devise irony interpretation tasks for children which further minimise the 
burden on core language and working memory, without reducing irony interpretation to a 
mere binary choice between a literal versus an ironic meaning.  
 
Conclusion 
 What is unambiguous in our findings is that seven-year-olds clearly take the knowledge 
state of the listener into account in order to determine whether an utterance is intended 
ironically or literally. Moreover, they are able to select an appropriate conversational response 
based on their assessment of this shared knowledge. Ours is the first experimental study to 
show that children this age use their mentalising abilities in this way to interpret irony. Such 
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Appendix A: Vignettes used in Pilot Study with children. 
1. The King and the Queen want to go for a picnic. It has just started to rain. They both 
look out of the window. King: “It’s a perfect day for a picnic” 
2. The King and the Queen are in the kitchen. The King knocks over a glass and spills 
the juice over the clean tablecloth. The Queen looks at the stain and says: “Well 
done.” 
3. Queen wants to draw a beautiful picture for her friend's birthday. She is trying to draw 
a beautiful butterfly. While she is drawing, the Queen’s crayon breaks in half. Queen: 
“I am so lucky today!” 
4. The King and the Queen are eating cake. The Queen has some chocolate on her face 
but she doesn’t like to be dirty.  Queen: “Can you pass me a napkin?” [King moves 
very, very slowly] Q: “You are so fast.” 
5. The King and the Queen play for the same football team. They really want to win this 
match. The Queen kicks the ball, clearly missing the net. King: “Great – now we’re 
definitely going to win.” 
 
 
Appendix B: Vignettes used in main study 
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3 The ‘Shared Knowledge’ version of the picnic vignette is adapted from Happé (1994).  
 
Shared Knowledge Non-Shared Knowledge 
Possible listener’s 
responses 
    
1.  3It is Sunday. Matt and 
Emma really want to go for 
a picnic in the park. They 
open the window curtains 
and they can both see that 
it is raining.  
Matt says, ‘It’s a perfect 
day for a picnic.’ 
 
Matt and Emma really want 
to go for a picnic in the park. 
Matt peaks through the 
closed curtains and he can 
see that it is raining. Emma 
cannot see the rain.  
Matt says, “It’s a perfect 
day for a picnic.” 
 
a) That’s great. 
Let’s go 
then. 
b) We could 
always have 
one inside.   
2.  Matt and Emma want to 
play football in the garden. 
Matt and Emma go to the 
room to bring the ball. 
They can both see that the 
ball is flat. 
Matt says, ‘That’s a great 
ball we have here!’ 
 
Matt and Emma want to play 
football in the garden. Matt 
goes to his room to bring the 
ball. Matt can see that the 
ball is flat. But Emma cannot 
see it. 
Matt says, ‘That’s a great 
ball we have here!’ 
 
a) We might 
need another 
ball then.  
b) Great, bring 
it over and 
let’s play!   
3.  Matt and Emma are going 
to their friend’s house. 
They are walking together. 
When they are at the gate, 
they can both see a very 
old house.  
Emma says to Matt, ‘Wow, 
this house is so new!’ 
 
Emma is going to see her 
friend’s house. Emma is at 
the gate and she can see a 
very old house. But Matt 
cannot see it. 
Emma says to Matt over the 
phone, "Wow, this house is 
so new!’ 
 
a) I think it 
needs some 
work! 
b) Do you like 
the style? 
4.  Emma and Matt are eating 
crisps.  They can both see 
that one crisp falls into the 
Emma is eating crisps. One 
crisp falls into the bin. Emma 
takes it from the bin and eats 




                                                          
4 The idea for the Shared Knowledge version of this vignette originates in an item from Bucciarelli, Colle & 
Bara (2003).  
bin. Emma takes the crisp 
from the bin and eats it.  
Matt says, ‘That must be 
yummy!’4 
 
it. Matt did not see the crisp 
falling to the bin. Matt says,  
‘That must be yummy’ 
 




5.  Emma and Matt just got 
their maths homework 
back. Emma asks Matt, 
‘Did you do well?’ 
Emma can see Matt’s 
notebook with the red 
crosses on it. Matt says,  
‘I have got so many right 
answers’.  
 
Emma and Matt just got their 
maths homework back. 
Emma asks Matt, ‘Did you 
do well?’ 
Emma cannot see Matt’s 
notebook with the red 
crosses on it. Matt says,  
‘I have got so many right 
answers’.  
a) Maybe the 
teacher got it 
wrong?  
b) I am happy 
for you! 
6.  Emma and Matt are eating 
chocolate cookies. Emma 
and Matt can see that 
Emma’s face is all dirty. 
Matt says, ‘You look 
great’ 
 
Emma and Matt are eating 
chocolate cookies. Emma’s 
face is all dirty but she 
cannot see it. Matt says, 
‘You look great” 
 
a) Thank you, 
that’s really 
nice of you.  
b) I know, I 
really need 
to clean up.  
 
7.  Emma and Matt are riding 
their bikes. Matt decided to 
ride around the big tree. 
When he was riding past 
Emma, he lost his balance 
and fell off the bike! Emma 
could see him falling off 
his bike. When he comes 
back on his bike, Emma 
Emma and Matt are riding 
their bikes. Matt decides to 
ride around the big tree. 
When he was riding, he lost 
his balance and fell off his 
bike! But Emma could not 
see him falling off his bike. 
When he comes back on his 
bike, Emma says, ‘You 
a) I am usually 
better than 
this.  
b) Thanks! But 





says, ‘You definitely 
know how to ride a bike!’ 
 
definitely know how to ride 
a bike!’ 
 
8.  Emma and Matt are sitting 
on the sofa. They are 
watching the football 
match. They both can see 
that the player from their 
favourite team clearly 
missed the net! 
Emma says, ‘Now, that 
was a great shot!’ 
 
Emma and Matt are watching 
the football match. Matt falls 
asleep and cannot see that the 
player from their favourite 
team clearly missed the net! 
When he wakes up, Emma 
says, ‘Now, that was a great 
shot!’ 
 
a) Was it? So 
our team 
won? 
b) I know! It’s 
a pity that he 
missed! 
9.  The washing machine has 
been working and now is 
finished. Emma and Matt 
are taking out the laundry 
from the washing machine. 
They can both see that the 
laundry that they took out 
is still all dirty.   
Matt says, ‘Our washing 
machine works so well!’ 
 
The washing machine has 
been working and now is 
finished. Matt is taking out 
the laundry from the washing 
machine. The laundry that he 
took out is still all dirty. But 
Emma cannot see Matt 
taking out the laundry. Matt 
says,  ‘Our washing 
machine works so well!’ 
 
a)  I think it 
needs fixing.   
b)  Yes, we are 
lucky to 
have it! 
10.  Matt and Emma are trying 
to vacuum the living room 
now. They can both clearly 
see that the vacuum is not 
working properly. All the 
dirt stays on the floor! 
Emma says, ‘ It’s so nice 
to see all the dirt 
disappearing so quickly’ 
Emma is trying to vacuum 
the hallway. But she can see 
that the vacuum is not 
working properly. All the dirt 
stays on the floor! 
But Matt cannot see the dirt. 
Emma says,  ‘It’s so nice to 
see all the dirt disappearing 
so quickly!’ 
a) Good job, 
thanks for 
vacuuming! 
b) We need a 
new vacuum 
cleaner. 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
